A more general model of price complexity by Chioveanu, Ioana
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A more general model of price
complexity
Ioana Chioveanu
Brunel University London
18 June 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/87466/
MPRA Paper No. 87466, posted 10 July 2018 09:27 UTC
A More General Model of Price Complexity
Ioana Chioveanuy
June 18, 2018
Abstract
This paper considers a model of competition in prices and price complexity levels,
which accommodates concave and convex confusion technologies. In symmetric equilib-
rium, the probability of using high complexity increases in the number of rms. In the
limit, as the number of competitors goes to innity, rms use high complexity almost
surely but the impact on consumer welfare depends on the characteristics of the confusion
technology. Specically, industry prots converge to the highest level with concave con-
fusion technologies and to the lowest level when with convex confusion technologies. An
improvement in consumer sophistication increases consumer welfare but does not reduce
market complexity.
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1 Introduction
In many retail markets, rms commonly use technical or involved language in their price
disclosures, partitioned prices, or di¤erentiated price formats, which make it harder for con-
sumers to identify the best o¤er. Price complexity is prevalent in markets for nancial and
banking products and energy retail. Although, it may be regarded as a benign by-product
of intrinsic product complexity, recent research has raised concerns about its strategic use to
soften price competition. In nearly homogeneous product markets, price complexity has been
associated with consumer ignorance, inertia, lack of sophistication, dispersion in prices and
price formats, positive mark-ups, and unintended responses to increased competitive pressure,
such as lower transparency for consumers.
Discussing the challenges of consumer nancial regulation, Campbell (2016) points out
that "nancial ignorance is pervasive and unsurprising given the complexity of modern nan-
cial products". The 2015 UK Competition and Market Authority investigation of the retail
banking market found that price complexity may prevent consumers from receiving good
value and identifying the best deals. A 2007 EC study of EU mortgage credit markets and
the 2011 report by the UK Independent Commission on Banking echo these concerns.1 There
is mounting evidence that rms use price complexity to exploit consumer bounded rationality.
Strategic price complexity draws on consumersbehavioral biases and on di¤erences in
their sophistication levels. To assess and compare complex prices, consumers need to spend
more time and/or e¤ort, and some are more likely to make mistakes or suboptimal choices due
to confusion. Strategic rms may deliberately increase price complexity to create consumer
confusion and soften competition in nearly homogeneous product markets.2 Research in
psychology and economics has shown that consumersdecisions are sensitive to the way in
which di¤erent alternatives are presented and to the di¢ culty of the choice environment.
A recent theoretical literature explores the role of price and choice complexity in homo-
geneous product markets, see Spiegler (2016) for a synthesis. These models send a consistent
message that complexity and equilibrium obfuscation increase in response to intensied com-
petition, weakening its positive e¤ects, and identify the possibility that an increase in the
number of rms harms consumer welfare.
1For instance, Woodward and Hall (2012) show that, in US mortgage markets, deals with the arrangement
fee rolled into the interest rate are better than those that quote these fees separately. For a recent discussion
of related empirical work, see Campbell (2016).
2Both experimental economics and marketing research show that more fragmented multi-part tari¤s can
limit price comparability, create confusion, and lead to suboptimal consumer choices. See Kalayc¬and Potters
(2011), Kalayc¬(2015), and the review by Greenleaf et al. (2015).
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This paper develops a richer modelling framework to accommodate more general con-
fusion technologies, and address some key questions. Is the degree of complexity a good
indicator of market performance? Does an increase in consumer sophistication increase mar-
ket transparency? Under what conditions does an increase in the number of competitors
harm consumer welfare? What type of tests can be used to assess the impact of competition
on welfare? Robust answers to these questions are crucial to the policy relevance of extant
ndings.
This analysis focuses on homogeneous product oligopoly markets where rms compete
in price and price complexity. Like in Carlin (2009), complexity makes it more di¢ cult to
assess prices and compare o¤ers, and prevents some consumers from identifying the best deal.
Given rmscomplexity choices, some consumers are informedor experts, while others are
confused. The experts are able to assess all prices and purchase the lowest-price product. The
confused buy from a randomly selected rm (or make random errors). The shares of experts
and confused consumers depend on rmsprice complexity choices. A unilateral incremental
increase in a rms price complexity increases the share of confused as it raises the di¢ culty
of assessing price o¤ers.
A distinctive feature of our extended model is that it allows a rms price complexity to
have a non-trivial impact on the di¢ culty of assessing a competitors o¤er and can accommo-
date a wider gamut of consumer behaviors. The increase in the share of confused triggered by
an increase in a rms price complexity may be either reduced or magnied by the complexity
of rivals price o¤ers. Specically, this analysis considers confusion technologies which are
either convex or concave in rmsaggregate price complexity choice. One interpretation of
this model is that an increase in complexity raises the cost of gathering market-wide infor-
mation and dissuades more consumers from assessing o¤ers.3 Then, convexity or concavity in
confusion can be related to convexity or concavity of the cost of gathering market-wide price
information.
As an illustration, consider a rm which increases the complexity of its price o¤er by
including more technical terms or using more sophisticated jargon. In a situation where there
is learning by doing, the e¤ect of an incremental increase in complexity would be smaller if
rivalsaggregate complexity were higher. Consumers may get better at deciphering technical
language the more they are exposed to it, and so there would be some reciprocal cancellation
of rms complexity levels. On the other hand, in a situation where consumers are more
3Alternatively, it may cause more random consumer mistakes, or it may make more consumers uphold their
default-options.
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likely to be demoralized or make mistakes as the informational load increases, the e¤ect of an
incremental increase in complexity may be larger when rivalsaggregate complexity is higher.
In this setting, price complexity underlies consumer heterogeneity and in symmetric equi-
librium rms choose prices randomly from a closed interval, according to a continuous dis-
tribution function.4 Moreover, there is a positive relationship between prices and complexity
levels: when a rm sets a relatively low price, it benets from more transparency, while when
it sets a relatively high price, it benets from more confusion. Despite product homogeneity,
prices are strictly above marginal cost and expected prots are strictly positive.
A duopoly analysis introduces some preliminary results, showing that an increase in the
convexity of the confusion technology (or a reduction in its concavity) leads to an increase in
transparency, a decrease in the lowest price associated with low complexity, a (weak) increase
in the lowest price associated with high complexity, a decrease in average prices and expected
industry prots, and an increase in expected consumer surplus. Intuitively, a deviation to low
complexity and a lower price is relatively more protable when the confusion technology is
less concave or more convex, as a larger decrease in rivalsconfusion e¤ectiveness triggers a
larger increase in the share of experts.
An increase in consumer sophistication decreases average prices and expected prots at
both rm and industry level. However, it has no impact on the frequency of using low com-
plexity. From a consumer policy perspective, programmes that raise consumer awareness or
understanding of the market (e.g., nancial literacy programmes) boost consumer surplus but
do not reduce the overall complexity of the market. This suggests that market transparency is
not a good indicator of the e¤ectiveness of consumer awareness initiatives or, more generally,
of how well a market performs.
The analysis of oligopoly markets indicates that an increase in the number of rms leads
to an increase in each rms probability of using high complexity and so to lower market
transparency. In relatively concentrated markets, expected industry prot is not monotonic
in the number of rms. In highly fragmented markets, if the confusion technology is concave,
expected share of confused and industry prots are bounded away from zero and converge to
the highest possible level as the number of competitors goes to innity. In contrast, if the
confusion technology is convex, expected number of confused consumers and industry prots
converge to zero. These ndings suggest that standard competition policy may backre in
relatively concentrated markets and be undesirable in fragmented markets where the confusion
4This framework is related to the broad literature on price dispersion; see Baye, Morgan, and Scholten
(2006) for a survey.
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technology is concave in the complexity level.
Drawing on the interpretation that concavity in confusion relates to the concavity of the
information gathering cost, our ndings suggest that consumer learning by doing may not
improve market performance in highly competitive environments. Indeed it may coexist with
poor outcomes for consumers, as it is compatible with highly e¤ective confusion technologies.
On the other hand, highly fragmented markets with convex confusion technologies may per-
form well. More generally, when competitive pressure is high, although rms use the high
complexity almost surely, the impact of complexity on market performance and an e¤ective
policy approach depend crucially on the confusion technology characteristics.
This analysis is related to those in Piccione and Spiegler (2012) and Chioveanu and Zhou
(2013), when price complexity is the main source of confusion, and especially to Carlin (2009).5
The latter analyzes the impact of complexity on market transparency in a model where rms
choose complexity levels from a closed interval. Carlin assumes that the confusion technology
is linear in the aggregate price complexity. Our analysis complements his work by considering
second order e¤ects in confusion and showing that these have policy implications.
Using the results in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), Carlin (2009) proves the existence of a
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, where rms only use the highest and lowest complexity
levels. Drawing on this result, our analysis also revisits the setting with no second order e¤ects
to characterize rmspricing strategies and prots in the unique symmetric equilibrium. Our
ndings indicate that the convergence properties of expected industry prots in a model with
no second order e¤ects are a limiting case, qualitatively consistent with the concave confusion
technology case.
Piccione and Spiegler (2012) explore a general comparability structure in a duopoly model
where consumers enter the market with a default bias, and identify a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for rms to earn max-min prots in equilibrium. In their setting, consumers are
initially attached to one rm and can only make price comparisons when formats are compat-
ible. The model presented here can also be interpreted as one where default-biased consumers
are randomly shared across rms and make market-wide price comparisons with a probability
which depends on the overall market complexity. Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) analyze an
oligopoly framework where rms can choose one of two price presentation formats. We show
that an increase in the number of rms induces rms to rely more on frame complexity and
5More broadly, this article contributes to the literature on behavioral industrial economics, in particular,
to work that explores the interaction between strategic rms and boundedly rational consumers. See Spiegler
(2011), Grubb (2015), and Heidhues and Koszegi (2018) for related discussions and surveys of recent work.
Armstrong (2008) provides a thorough discussion of policy issues.
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may harm consumer welfare. In these analyses, the emphasis is on the price comparability
structure and how it is a¤ected by price presentation.6
A di¤erent branch of literature explores strategic obfuscation in sequential search models
with fully rational consumers. In Ellison and Wolitzky (2012), consumerssearch costs are
strictly convex in shopping time. They argue that strict convexity of the disutility of time
is a realistic assumption because disutility would be convex in a standard time allocation
model with decreasing returns to leisure. But, they also note that the consideration of cost
concavity might be a more suitable if there is consumer learning by doing.7
Next section formulates the model, introduces a taxonomy of confusion technologies, and
discusses its microfoundations. Section 3 presents some preliminary results, while section
4 illustrates the equilibrium derivation and basic ndings in a duopoly model. Section 5
characterizes the unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in the general oligopoly model.
Section 6 focuses on comparative statics and convergence results, and discusses consumer
protection and competition policy implications. All proofs missing from the text are relegated
to the appendices.
2 Model
Consider a market for a homogeneous product with n  2 identical rms. Marginal costs
of production are constant and normalized to zero. There is a unit mass of consumers, each
demanding at most one unit of the product and willing to pay at most v = 1.8 Firms simul-
taneously and noncooperatively choose prices, pi for i 2 N = f1; 2; :::ng, and the complexity
of their prices. There are two possible complexity levels and each rm can choose just one
of them, ki 2 fk; kg, where k > k. The prole of rmsprice complexity choices is k, an
n-vector whose i-th component is ki. Complexity is related to the way in which rms convey
price information and can be adjusted at the same time as prices, which is reected by the
timing.9
A reduced-form model which may accommodate di¤erent interpretations is introduced
rst where complexity increases the di¢ culty of assessing rmsprice o¤ers and is a source of
6Closer to Carlin (2009), the current analysis considers a two stage process where complexity focuses con-
sumersattention and may dissuade them completely from making price comparisons.
7See also Wilson (2010) and Taylor (2017) for related analyses of obfuscation.
8The normalizations of marginal costs and reservation values are made for expositional ease and without
loss of generality.
9Price complexity in this setting is a form of price framing. Alternatively, rms may engage in product
framing- a form of spurious product di¤erentiation, e.g., involving decisions on product size or packaging -
which cannot be adjusted as frequently as prices and is better captured by a sequential move framework. See
the related discussion in Chioveanu and Zhou (2013).
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consumer confusion.10 Based on rms complexity choices, there are two types of consumers,
experts (or informed) and confused (or uninformed). The experts purchase the cheapest
product that provides positive surplus, while the confused buy at random, so that they choose
a particular rm with probability 1=n. The model is also consistent with a default-bias
interpretation, whereby each consumer is initially assigned to one rm and the rms have
equal bases of consumers ex-ante. In this case, confused consumers uphold their default
option, while the experts select the cheapest alternative.
The rmsprice complexity levels determine the share of experts in the market, which is
assumed to be a symmetric function. Due to symmetry, for a given k, the fractions of experts
and confused are solely determined by n   m, the count of k in k (or alternatively, by m,
the count of k in k) where m 2 f0; 1; :::ng. Hence, the share of experts can be written as a
function,
 : N! [0; 1] :
This analysis considers markets, like those for nancial or banking products, where there are
always some expert consumers, although it allows all consumers to be confused if all rms
use k. Specically, the share of experts when n m rms use k is (n m)  0, with strict
inequality for m  1. Denote (n)  min and, for simplicity, let (0) = 1.11
By making it more di¢ cult to assess rmso¤ers, an increase in one rms price complexity
increases the fraction of confused in the market, so
1  (n m) < 1  (n m+ 1) : (1)
To capture the impact of a rivals price complexity on the di¢ culty of evaluating a rms
o¤er, let
(n m  1)  (n m) = (n m)  (n m+ 1)
   1 ; (2)
for all m and  > 1. This formulation parametrizes the rate of change of the incremental
share of experts, which is summarized by (   1), and provides a tractable way to explore
more general confusion technologies. If  > 2 ( < 2), a unilateral incremental increase in
complexity is more (less) e¤ective when the rivalscomplexity is higher (lower), i.e. rms
complexity levels reinforce (o¤set) each other in creating confusion. Specically, depending
on the value of  6= 2, (2) provides a taxonomy of confusion technologies.
10The main analysis adopts a microfoundation of consumer confusion rooted in the cost of processing infor-
mation, which is presented at the end of this section.
11 In a market where (0) 2 (0; 1), possibly due to the intrinsic characteristics of the product, rms cannot
completely eliminate price complexity. So, even when all rms use the simplest price structure available, some
consumers get confused. However, this does not change the results qualitatively.
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Case 1 Concavity. When 1 <  < 2, the confusion technology (1  ) is concave in the
number of complex prices in the market. Formally, (1) and (2) imply that
(1  (n m))  (1  (n m  1)) > (1  (n m+ 1))  (1  (n m)) :
so that a rms incremental increase in price complexity is more e¤ective in creating confusion
when rivalsprice complexity is lower (in the sense that fewer competitors employ k).
Case 2 Convexity. When  > 2, the confusion technology (1  ) is convex in the number
of complex prices in the market. Formally, (1) and (2) imply that
(1  (n m))  (1  (n m  1)) < (1  (n m+ 1))  (1  (n m)) :
so that a rms incremental increase in price complexity is more e¤ective when rivalsprice
complexity is higher.
The LHS di¤erences in Cases 1 and 2 capture the increase in the share of confused triggered
by a unilateral increase in complexity when n m  1 other rms use k (and m rivals use k),
while the RHS di¤erences capture the corresponding increase when n  m other rms use k
(and m rivals use k):
Expression (2) implies that
1  (1) = (n m  1)  (n m)
(   1)n 1 m =
(n  1)  min
(   1)n 1 :
Then it follows that
1  (n m) = (1  min)[(   1)
n m   1]
(   1)n   1 for  6= 2 : (3)
The share of confused for given n   m can be expressed in terms of the primitives of the
model: the market structure (n), the curvature (), and the degree of consumer sophistication
as measured by the highest possible share of confused consumers (1  min).12
Case 3 No Second Order E¤ects. When  = 2, the price complexity of one rm does not
a¤ect the e¤ectiveness of an increase in a rivals complexity. Formally, (1) and (2) imply that
(1  (n m))  (1  (n m  1)) = (1  (n m+ 1))  (1  (n m)) :
This case is closely related to Carlin (2009) and (3) is replaced by
1  (n m) = (1  min)(n m)
n
for  = 2 : (4)
The main analysis focuses on  6= 2; but a characterization of the equilibrium for  = 2 is
included at the end of section 5 and the policy discussion in section 6 covers all cases.
12 It can shown that if (0) 2 (0; 1), the share of confused when n  m rms exactly use k is equal to the
expression in (3) plus a constant equal to (1  (0)).
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As the share of experts is assumed to be a symmetric function of rmsprice complexity
levels, in the setting above it is expressed as a function of the count of k in k. Alternatively,
the share of experts could be written as a function of the prole of rmsprice complexity
choices, '(k). Then, Case 1 corresponds to a situation where there is substitutability in
confusion, that is, the confusion technology (1   ') satises strictly decreasing di¤erences,
while Case 2 corresponds to a situation where there is complementarity in confusion, that is,
the confusion technology (1   ') satises strictly increasing di¤erences.13 A more detailed
description of this alternative formulation is relegated to the online appendix.
2.1 A Microfoundation of Consumer Confusion
The reduced form model can be related to an environment where consumers have limited time
availability and incur a time cost to assess rmso¤ers, so that they use a two-step approach.
Depending on their time availability and the overall market complexity, they rst decide if to
collect information on prices or not. The consumers can directly observe the overall market
complexity: for instance, they may receive information amalgamated by the media or social
networks or transmitted via word-of-mouth. However, they do not observe individual rms
complexity levels unless they decide to collect information. Complexity focuses consumers
attention to this particular aspect and may dissuade them from gathering price information.
When a consumer decides to gather information, they buy the lowest-price product. When a
consumer decides not to collect price information, they select a product randomly or uphold
their default-option.
Consumers have time availability t, which is a random variable, and incur a time cost
to assess rmso¤ers and identify the best deal. Let t be distributed on an interval [tL; tH ]
according to a continuous probability distribution function G(t), with G0(t) > 0.14 Let (n 
m) be consumers cost of gathering information where n   m is the count of k in k and
measures market-wide complexity. Suppose that it is more costly for consumers to assess
price information when more rms use k, that is, (n  m) < (n  m + 1).15 Then, if t >
(n   m), consumers gather information on all price o¤ers and choose the best deal. This
happens with probability 1   G((n   m)). If t < (n   m), consumers choose a random
product or uphold their default option. This happens with probability G((n m)):
13Here substitutability and complementarity are not strategic (as they do not relate to rmsprots). See
Vives, 1999, Ch. 2 for general discussion.
14Alternatively, consumers may be heterogeneous and G(t) gives the distribution of time availability in the
population.
15Even if consumers restrict their consideration sets, in a more complex environment it would be harder to
decide which rms to include.
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The resulting share of confused is
1  (n m) = G((n m)) :
As G0 > 0, G((n m)) < G((n m+ 1)) then 1  (n m) < 1  (n m+ 1), as in the
reduced-form model. Moreover, (2) requires that
(G  ) (n m)  (G  )(n m  1) = (G  )(n m+ 1)  (G  )(n m)
   1 : (5)
In the examples below, consumerstime availability is a draw from a uniform distribution.
Example 1 Let G  U [a; b] for b > a  0 so that G(t) = (t  a)= (b  a), (1  (n m)) =
((n m)  a) =(b  a), and (n m) = fc [(   1)n m   1] = (  2)g+ a. It can be checked
that (5) holds. For  2 (1; 2) and  > 2, (n   m) identies a concave and, respectively,
convex cost sequence.
Using (2) and (5), consistency requires that in this example
c =
(1  min)(b  a)(   2)
(   1)n   1 :
Example 2 Let G  U [a; b] for b > a  0 so that G(t) = (t   a)= (b   a) and (n  m) =
c(n m) + a. It can be checked that (5) implies that  = 2.
Like in the previous example, consistency with the reduced form model requires that
c =
(1  min)(b  a)
n
:
In Example 1, concavity of the confusion technology (Case 1) captures learning-by-doing
in the market. In contrast, convexity of the confusion technology (Case 2) captures an envi-
ronment where there is information processing overload: consumers are increasingly likely to
give up as aggregate complexity increases.
Our reduced form model is closely related to the frameworks in Piccione and Spiegler
(2012) and Chioveanu and Zhou (2013). However, these papers analyze the impact of price
complexity (and, more generally, price framing) on the comparability structure. In contrast,
the microfoundation presented above focuses on markets where consumers use a two-stage
decision making process and where strategic price complexity directs consumer attention on
this particular feature of the market. Here, complexity makes gains from comparisons or
switching less obvious and may discourage information gathering or reinforce inertia.
Below alternative conceptual foundations for Cases 1 and 2 are discussed.
Complexity as a Source of Errors. Suppose that the presence of complex prices increases
the probability that consumers make a random choice error. Consider a market where exactly
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n m rms are using the highest complexity (k), withm  n 1: Suppose that the probability
that consumers make a random error (which may be due to upholding a default-option)
because rm i uses k is given by n m 2 (0; 1) and is identical but independent of the
probability that they get confused because rm j uses k.16 Then, the overall probability that
consumers get confused when facing n m complex prices is 1 (1 n m)n m, which implies
that (n m) = (1  n m)n m. Using (3), consistency requires
1  (1  n m)n m =
(1  min)[(   1)n m   1]
(   1)n   1 : (6)
Example 3 Concavity of Confusion Technology. Suppose that n m =  for all m.
Then (n m) = (1  )n m satises (1) and the confusion technology is concave, i.e. Case
1 applies.
In this case, the e¤ectiveness of confusion (as given by ) is constant, but the pool of
consumers that a rm can confuse by increasing its price complexity from k to k is decreasing
in the number of competitors which use complex prices. For example, when only one rival
uses k, the targetgroup of a rm is (1   ), whereas when two rivals use k, the target
group shrinks to (1  )2. Intuitively, the confusion technology is concave also when n m is
decreasing in (n  m) as then, when more rivals use complex prices, a rm not only faces a
smaller target group but also is less e¤ective.
The discussion above shows that a necessary condition for the confusion technology to be
convex is n m > n (m+1), i.e., the probability that consumers make a random error when
any rm i uses k must increase in the number of complex prices. This may be the case, for
instance, if consumers are more likely to make an error when the choice environment is more
di¢ cult. The following numerical example illustrates this case.
Example 4 Convexity of Confusion Technology. Let n = 4,  = 3, and (1   min) =
0:5. Then, using (6), 1 = 0:0125 ((1) = 0:9875), 2 = 0:0250 ((2) = 0:95), 3 = 0:0573
((3) = 0:8375), and 4 = 0:1591. It is then easy to check that Case 2 applies.
3 Preliminary Findings
Given competitorsprice and price complexity choices (p i;k i), rm is ex post prot can
be written as
i(pi; ki;p i;k i) = pi 

(1  (n m))
n
+ qi(pi;p i)(n m)

,
16This interpretation can be related to an irrational version of the quantal response equilibrium (QRE),
where players make random errors when choosing a strategy, even when they know which is the best deal, and
where each rm is equally likely to be selected.
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where rm is share of informed consumers, qi(pi;p i), is given below.
qi(pi;p i) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1 if pi < minfpj ; 1g for 8 j 2 N , j 6= i ;
1
jHj if pi = pj  1, 8 j 2 H  N , and pl > pi, 8 l 2 N nH, j; l 6= i ;
0 if pi > minfpj ; 1g for j 2 N , j 6= i .
The rst term in square brackets in i is rm is share of confused consumers, while the second
term is rm is share of experts. All experts buy from rm i if its price is strictly lower than
rivalsprices. If rm i and other rms tie at the lowest price, then they share equally the
experts. If at least one rm j 6= i o¤ers a price pj lower than pi, then rm i does not sell to
experts.
Although confused consumers are unable to accurately compare prices, they do not pay
more than their valuation. If rms charge prices above v = 1, the consumers would realize
at checkout (or after purchase) and decline the purchase (or return the product free of cost).
Therefore, in this setting, rms have no incentives to charge prices in excess of consumerswill-
ingness to pay. Moreover, confused consumers do not infer prices from price complexity levels.
So, even if high complexity were consistently associated with higher prices, consumers would
not understand this relationship. If consumers participate infrequently in the market, they
may not have a chance to learn about this relationship. For instance, some consumers only
take few mortgages in their lifetime, or change their gas and electricity providers infrequently.
Lemma 1 There is no equilibrium where all rms use pure price complexity strategies.
Proof. (a) Suppose all rms choose k for sure (that is, there are (0) = 1 experts).
Then, rms would compete á la Bertrand and make zero prot. But, if a rm unilaterally
deviates to k and a positive price (no greater than one), it makes strictly positive prot. A
contradiction.
(b) Suppose exactly n   m rms use k (for m  1). (a) implies that m < n. Then
there are (n   m) < 1 experts and 1   (n   m) confused consumers, and the results
in Varian (1980) apply. The unique candidate equilibrium dictates mixed strategy pric-
ing according to a c.d.f. on [p0; 1] and each rms expected prot is (1   (n   m))=n =
p0 [1  (1  (n m))(n  1)=n]. But, if one of the n m rms choosing k deviates to (p0; k)
it makes prot p0 [1  (1  (n m  1))(n  1)=n] > p0 [1  (1  (n m))(n  1)=n].
(c) Suppose all rms choose k for sure (that is, there are (n) = min experts). If min > 0,
the argument in (b) applies unchanged. If min = 0, then in the unique candidate equilib-
rium pi = 1 and i = 1=n for all i. But then if a rm unilaterally deviates to k and price
12
pi = 1   ", it obtains prot (1  ") [(1  (n  1))=n+ (n  1)] > 1=n for " < (n   1)=
[1=(n  1) + (n  1)].
Lemma 1 implies that in any candidate equilibrium at least one rm randomizes its price
complexity. Therefore, with positive probability rms face both expert and confused con-
sumers. The conict between the incentives to fully exploit confused consumers and to vigor-
ously compete for the experts rules out equilibria involving pure price strategies. The proof
of the following result is standard and therefore omitted.17
Lemma 2 There is no equilibrium where all rms use pure pricing strategies.
Lemmas 1 and 2 show that in any equilibrium there must be dispersion in both price
complexities and prices. A rms strategy space is [0; 1]fk; kg. Denote by i  i(pi; ki) rm
is mixed strategy over price and price complexity. This analysis focuses on symmetric mixed
strategies, where F (p) is the marginal c.d.f. of rmsrandom prices, dened on an interval S 
[0; 1], and (p) and 1 (p) are the probabilities that price p 2 S is associated with complexity
level k and k, respectively. Then, the overall probability of using k is
R
p2S(p)dF (p) 2 (0; 1).
The following result presents properties of rmspricing strategies.
Lemma 3 In symmetric equilibrium, (i) the support of the pricing distribution (S) is a con-
nected interval; (ii) if min > 0 the pricing c.d.f. is continuous everywhere, while if min = 0,
it is continuous everywhere except possibly at the upper bound of S; and (iii) inf S = p0 > 0
and supS = 1.
Next section builds on these ndings to characterize the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Sec-
tion 4 illustrates the approach in a simple duopoly framework and presents some preliminary
comparative statics results. Section 5 analyses a general oligopoly model, while section 6
discusses competition and consumer protection policy implications, by combining analytical
results and numerical simulations.
4 Duopoly Analysis
Consider a duopoly market and suppose rm j 6= i follows the mixed strategy j presented in
section 3. At a given price pj , rm j uses the lowest complexity k with probability (pj) and
the highest complexity with probability 1   (pj). Firm js price is a random draw from its
price c.d.f. Then, rm is prot at price p  p0 = minS > 0 and complexity k is given by
i (p; k) = p
Z 1
p
[(pj)(0) + (1  (pj))(1)] dF (pj) +
p
2
Z 1
p0
[(pj)(1  (0)) + (1  (pj))(1  (1))] dF (pj) : (7)
17See, for instance, the analyses in Varian (1980) and Rosenthal (1980).
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For a given realization of rivals price pj , the rst square bracket gives the expected share of
experts. If rm j also uses k, which happens with probability (pj), the share of experts is
(0); if, instead, it uses k, which happens with probability 1   (pj), the share of experts is
(1). Similarly, for a given pj , the second square bracket gives the expected share of confused
consumers. As rm js price pj is a random draw, these expected shares are integrated over
the relevant realizations of pj . Firm i serves experts whenever the rivals price is higher
(pj > p), whereas it serves half of the confused consumers for all pjs.
Firm is prot at price p and complexity k is
i
 
p; k

= p
Z 1
p
[(pj)(1) + (1  (pj))(2)] dF (pj) +
p
2
Z 1
p0
[(pj)(1  (1)) + (1  (pj))(1  (2))] dF (pj) : (8)
The terms in square brackets present the expected shares of experts and, respectively, confused
consumers for a given realization of rivals price pj . However, in this case, if rm j chooses
the lowest complexity k - which happens with probability (pj) - there are (1) experts and
(1 (1)) confused. If rm j chooses the high complexity k - which happens with probability
1 (pj) - then there are (2) = min experts and (1 (2)) = (1 min) confused. Firm js
price pj is a random draw from its pricing c.d.f. The share of experts is integrated over all
the price realizations where rm i serves these consumers (i.e., for all pj > p). Firm i serves
half of the confused consumers for all pjs.
Substituting (0) = 1, and using (3), (7) and (8), the incremental protability of an
increase in complexity is
i
 
p; k
  i (p; k) = p(1  (1))
2

 
Z 1
p
(pj)dF (pj) +
Z p
p0
(pj)dF (pj)

; (9)
where (pj)  [1 + (1   (pj))(   2))] > 0. Evaluating (9) at p = p0 and p = 1 gives,
respectively,
p0(1  (1))
2

 
Z 1
p0
(pj)dF (pj)

< 0 and
(1  (1))
2
Z 1
p0
(pj)dF (pj)

> 0 :
(9) is strictly increasing in p. The rst term in brackets (which is negative) decreases as p
increases (the integration range is smaller), whereas the second term in brackets (which is
positive) increases as p increases (the integration range is wider). To maximize its expected
prot, rm i chooses
k(p) =
8>>><>>>:
k if p < p^ ;
k if p > p^ ;
k, 8k 2 fk; kg if p = p^ ;
(10)
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where the threshold price p^ follows from equating (9) to zero. So, in symmetric equilibrium,
prices below a cut-o¤ level p^ > p0 are associated with complexity level k, while price above p^,
are associated with k, and each rm assigns probability  =
R 1
p0
(p)dF (p) = F (p^) 2 (0; 1) to
complexity level k and 1   to complexity level k. A formal proof of this result is presented
in the next section for the general oligopoly model.
Suppose now that rm j 6= i uses the price complexity strategy identied above and that
F (p) satises Lemma 3. Then, rm is expected prots at p = p0 and when p! p^ are
i (p0; k) = p0

+
(1  )(1 + (1))
2

and lim
p!p^
i (p; k) =
p^
2
(1  )(1 + (1)) ;
whereas rm is expected prots at p = p^ and p = 1 are
i
 
p^; k

=
p^
2
[1  (1) + (1  )min] and i
 
1; k

=
1
2
[1  (1)  (1  )min] :
The expected prots for an arbitrary price p are presented in the appendix. Constant
prot conditions imply that in duopoly equilibrium the probability of using k and expected
individual prot are given by
1   = 1

2 (0; 1) and  = (1  min) (2   1)
22
; (11)
while the boundary prices p0 and p^ are
p0 =
(1  min)(2   1)
22   (1  min)
2 (0; 1) and p^ = (1  min)(2   1)
2   (1  min)
2 (0; 1] : (12)
Note that p^ = 1 i¤ min = 0.
Finally, F (p) is implicitly determined by (k; p) =  and (k; p) = , and presented in
the appendix. For min = 0, the price distribution has a mass point at the upper bound of its
support as (1  F (1)) = 1=.
Proposition 1 In the unique symmetric duopoly equilibrium, rms choose prices randomly
according to the c.d.f. F (p) presented in (A1). Prices on [p0; p^) are associated with the
low price complexity (k), while prices on [p^; 1] are associated with the high price complexity 
k

, with p0 and p^ dened in (12). Each rm chooses k with probability  = F (p^) and k
with probability 1   . The probability  is presented in (11), together with a rms expected
equilibrium prot, .
For min > 0, symmetric equilibrium price c.d.f. is continuous everywhere. In contrast,
for min = 0; p^ = 1 and the equilibrium price distribution is continuous for all p < 1, but has
an atom at the upper bound as limp%1F (p) = (   1)= < F (1) = 1. There is dispersion in
both prices and price complexity levels, a positive relationship between prices and complexity,
and rmsstrategies and market outcomes depend on both  and min:
15
 is related to the curvature of the confusion technology. When  2 (1; 2); an increase in
 translates into a reduction in the concavity of the confusion technology: a rms attempt to
confuse consumers is thwarted to a lesser extent by rivals complexity choices. When  > 2, an
increase in  corresponds to an increase in the convexity of the confusion technology, and so
a rms attempt to confuse is magnied to a higher extent by competitors complexity choice.
min is the share of expert consumers when both rms use the high price complexity (k) and
measures consumer sophistication, with a higher value corresponding to higher rationality or
sophistication.
Figure 1 illustrates symmetric equilibrium price c.d.f.s for given min and two values of
. Solid lines correspond to prices associated with the low complexity k, while dashed lines
correspond to k.
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0.0
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F(p)
Figure 1: Symmetric Equilibrium Pricing Distributions when min = :6. In bue for  = 3=2,
where p0 = 0:195; p^ = 0:307, and  = 0:178 . In red for  = 3, where p0 = 0:113; p^ = 0:357
and  = 0:111.
Corollary 1 In the symmetric duopoly equilibrium, the probability of using the low price
complexity () and expected share of confused increase in , the lower bound of the pricing
c.d.f. (p0) decreases in , the cut-o¤ price (p^) increases in  for min > 0 and is independent
of  for min = 0, expected individual prot (), expected industry prot (2), and the average
price decrease in .
An increase in  increases market transparency as rms use k more frequently, and it
boosts expected consumer surplus, as it decreases the average price. However, it also leads
to more price dispersion (as it lowers p0). As total welfare is constant (and normalized to
one), a decrease in industry prot corresponds to an equal increase in consumer surplus. As 
increases, a rms incentive to use the high complexity is lower as it operates in an environment
16
where strategic complexity is more e¤ective (or, at least, less ine¤ective). Figure 2 illustrates
how the probability of using k and industry prot vary with , for given min.
2 4 6 8 10
0.0
0.5
1.0
beta
Figure 2: Probability of using k (in red) and industry prot (in black) as functions of  for
n = 2 and min = :6.
While average prices decrease in , it is less obvious how the average price conditional on
low complexity varies with . For instance, in Figure 1, an increase in  from 3=2 to 3 triggers
an increase in the cumulative probability at each price p which was assigned positive density
for  = 3=2 and also a decrease in p0. These two e¤ects indicate that the average price for
 = 3 is lower than that for  = 3=2. However, the change in the average price conditional
on low complexity is a¤ected by an additional e¤ect which partly o¤sets these two, as the
cut-o¤ price p^ increases in . Using (A1), the price distribution conditional on the price being
below the cut-o¤ value p^ and the corresponding conditional expected price are presented in
the appendix. It can be checked that the expected price conditional on low complexity is not
generally monotonic in . For instance, for min = 0:6, it increases for low values of  and
then decreases, while for min = 0, it monotonically decreases in .
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Corollary 2 In symmetric duopoly equilibrium, the probability of using the low price com-
plexity () is independent of min, while the lower bound of the pricing c.d.f. (p0), the cut-o¤
price (p^), expected individual prot (), expected industry prot (2), expected share of con-
fused, the average price, and the average price conditional on low complexity, all decrease in
min.
Consumer policies which increase the degree of consumer sophistication, for instance,
nancial literacy programmes, decrease average prices and expected share of confused con-
sumers, and increase expected consumer surplus. However, they increase price dispersion (by
18When min = 0:6, the expected price conditional on low complexity is 0.25115 for  = 1:05, 0.25149 for
 = 1:15, and 0.24292 for  = 1:5:
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decreasing the lower bound of the pricing support, p0) and do not a¤ect market transparency
as reected by rmsprobability of choosing low complexity. These results suggest that mar-
ket transparency and price dispersion may not be good indicators of the success of consumer
education programmes or of market performance.
5 Oligopoly Equilibrium
This section characterizes the symmetric equilibrium in oligopoly markets. It mainly focuses
on a framework where the confusion technology is either concave or convex in rmsprice
complexity levels (where either  < 2 or  > 2), but also includes a variant without second
order e¤ects ( = 2).
Consider an arbitrary rm i 2 N . Suppose that rm is competitors follow the mixed
strategy presented in section 2. So the competitors choose prices randomly from a distribution
function F (p), which satises Lemma 3, the probability that a (random) price p is associated
with the low complexity k is given by (p), and the probability that p is associated with high
complexity k is 1   (p). Although rm is competitors choose prices from the same c.d.f.,
their price draws may be di¤erent and so the probabilities of using k may also be di¤erent
across these rms.
Let }(N i) be the power set of N i = N n fig and Mm = fM  }(N i) j jM j = mg.
}(N i) is the set of all subsets of N i andMm is the set of all subsets of }(N i) of cardinality
m. Consider competitorsex post price prole p i 2 Sn 1 and let pj and pl (j; l 6= i) stand
for elements of p i. Denote by
Pmn 1 =
X
MMm
" Q
j2M
(pj)
Q
k2N iM
(1  (pl))
#
; (13)
the overall probability that out of n  1 rivals exactly m  0 use k and n m  1 use k).
Example 5 Let n = 3, N i = fj; lg, and p i = (pj ; pl). Using (13), P22 = (pj)(pl),
P12 = [(pj)(1  (pl)) + (1  (pj))(pl)] ; and P02 = (1   (pj))(1   (pl)). In this case,
}(N i) = f?; fjg; flg; fj; lgg, M2 = fj; lg, M1 = ffjg; flgg, and M0 = f?g.
Using (13), rm is expected prot at price p  p0 = minS > 0 and complexity k is given
by
i (p; k) = p
Z 1
p
:::
Z 1
p

n 1P
m=0
Pmn 1(n m  1)

dF (pj):::dF (pl) +
p
n
Z 1
p0
:::
Z 1
p0

n 1P
m=0
Pmn 1(1  (n m  1))

dF (pj):::dF (pl) :
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The rst term in i (p; k) corresponds to rm is prot on the expert consumer segment.
When out of n   1 rivals exactly m  0 use k and n  m   1 use k, given that rm i also
employs k, there are (n  m   1) experts. The rst term in square brackets sums up over
all values of m. Firm i serves experts only if its price is lower than rivalsprices, which is
reected when integrating over pj > p for all j 6= i. The second term is rm is prot on
the confused consumer segment. Firm i serves a share 1=n of these consumers. The second
term in square brackets sums the corresponding share of confused (1  (n m  1)) over all
values of m. Firm i serves its share of confused regardless of rivalsprices, which is reected
by integrating over pj > p0 for all j 6= i.
Using (13), rm is expected prot at price p and complexity k is
i
 
p; k

= p
Z 1
p
:::
Z 1
p

n 1P
m=0
Pmn 1(n m)

dF (pj):::dF (pl) +
p
n
Z 1
p0
:::
Z 1
p0

n 1P
m=0
Pmn 1(1  (n m))

dF (pj):::dF (pl) :
The expression for i
 
p; k

is analogous to the one for i (p; k) ; with the di¤erence that, when
exactly m  0 out of n  1 rivals use the lowest complexity k, as rm i employs k, there are
(n m) experts and (1  (n m)) confused.
The incremental protability of an increase in complexity (i
 
p; k
 i (p; k)) is given by
 (n  1) p
n
Z 1
p
:::
Z 1
p

n 1P
m=0
Pmn 1((n m  1)  (n m))

dF (pj):::dF (pk)
+
p
n
Z p
p0
:::
Z p
p0

n 1P
m=0
Pmn 1((n m  1)  (n m))

dF (pj):::dF (pk) :
This expression can be simplied using the following result which draws on (3).
Lemma 4 Suppose n  2 and m  n   1. Let p i be the ex post price prole of rm is
competitors and (pj)  [1 + (1  (pj))(   2)], where pj is an element of p i. Then,
n 1P
m=0
Pmn 1((n m  1)  (n m)) = (1  (1))
Q
j 6=i
(pj) :
By (4), the incremental protability of an increase in complexity becomes
i
 
p; k
  i (p; k) = p(1  (1))  n  1
n
Q
j 6=i
Z 1
p
(pj)dF (pj) +
1
n
Q
j 6=i
Z p
p0
(pj)dF (pj)
!
:
(14)
This expression generalizes the incremental protability of an increase in complexity presented
in section 4, and similar reasoning leads to the next result.
Proposition 2 In symmetric mixed-strategy oligopoly equilibrium, a rms complexity level
depends only on its price. The rms choose prices according to a c.d.f. F (p) with support
S = [p0; 1]. If p < p^, rms choose complexity k, if p > p^, rms choose complexity k, and if
p = p^, rms are indi¤erent between the two complexity levels.
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When a rm chooses relatively low prices, it benets from more market transparency, as
it is more likely to serve the experts. In contrast, when a rm chooses relatively high prices,
it relies more on confused consumers and benets from higher complexity. As a result, in
equilibrium there is a positive relationship between prices and price complexity levels and
a rms complexity choice is determined by its price draw. Each rm assigns probability
 = F (p^) 2 (0; 1) to complexity level k and 1   to complexity level k.
The proof of the next result uses the approach illustrated in section 4 and is relegated to
the appendix. Drawing on Proposition 2, a rms expected prot for a price p 2 [p0; p^) (which
is associated with low complexity, k) and for a price p 2 [p^; 1] (which is associated with high
complexity, k), and mixed strategy equilibrium constant prot conditions are also presented
there. Recall that (n) = min.
Proposition 3 For n  2 and  6= 2, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium, where rms
choose prices randomly according to a c.d.f. F (p) dened on [p0; 1] where p0 > 0. Each rm
chooses complexity k with probability 1   = 1  F (p^), where
1   = n
 1=(n 1)
1 + (   2)(1  n 1=(n 1)) 2 (0; 1) ; (15)
and complexity k with probability . Each rms expected prot is
 = (1  min)

n(1  )n 1(   1)n   1
n[(   1)n   1] : (16)
If min > 0, then p^ < 1 and F (p) is continuous everywhere. If min = 0, then p^ = 1 and F (p)
is continuous for p 2 [p0; p^), but has an atom at p^.
In homogeneous product markets, where rms compete by simultaneously choosing prices
and price complexity levels, there is dispersion in both dimensions in equilibrium. These
ndings are consistent with observed patters in markets for nancial and banking products,
or markets for gas and electricity. Firms make strictly positive prots and charge prices in
excess of marginal cost. The rmsequilibrium strategies and market outcomes depend on
market structure (as captured by n), the curvature of the confusion technology (), and the
degree of consumer sophistication (min).
A Model without Second Order E¤ects
So far, the analysis has focused on  6= 2. Below, a variant of the model where  = 2
(and so there are no second order e¤ects) is discussed. The preliminary results in Lemmas
1-3 carry over unchanged. The  = 2 case is closely related to Carlin (2009), who analyses a
market where "an individual rms complexity choice may add di¢ culty to the overall task of
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becoming informed, [but] does not magnify the e¤ect of other rmscomplexity choices on the
cost of becoming informed". In Carlins model the rms choose complexity levels from a closed
interval [k; k], but in symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium they randomize only between the
extreme values of this interval. His analysis proves the existence of a cut-o¤ mixed strategy
equilibrium. The next result fully characterizes the unique symmetric equilibrium of a variant
with only two price complexity levels (ki 2 fk; kg). The proof is relegated to the online
appendix.
Proposition 4 For n  2 and  = 2, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium, where rms
choose prices randomly according to a c.d.f. F (p) dened on [p0; 1] where p0 > 0. Each rm
chooses complexity k with probability 1   = 1  F (p^), given by
1   = n  1n 1 2 (0; 1) ; (17)
and complexity k with probability . Each rms equilibrium prot  is given by
 = (1  min)
1  n  1n 1 + nn 2n 1
n2
: (18)
If min > 0, then p^ < 1 and F (p) is continuous everywhere. If min = 0, then p^ = 1 and F (p)
is continuous for p 2 [p0; p^) but has an atom at p^.
6 Discussion and Policy Implications
This section explores equilibrium comparative statics and convergence results, and discusses
their implications for competition and consumer protection policy. It builds on Propositions
3 and 4, and focuses on the impact of changes in (i) competitive pressure as measured by the
number of rms (n); (ii) degree of consumer sophistication as measured by the lowest share of
experts (min); and (iii) the concavity or convexity of the confusion technology as measured
by the value of .
Corollary 3 In the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, the probability that each rm as-
signs to the lowest complexity level k () decreases in the number of rms (n), is independent of
the degree of consumer sophistication (min), and increases in the degree of concavity/convexity
. Moreover, limn!1  = 0.
In more fragmented markets, to o¤set the impact of increased competitive pressure, rms
rely more on consumer confusion and so choose high price complexity more frequently. In the
limit, as the number of competitors goes to innity, rms use high price complexity almost
surely. Hence, in settings where rms compete by choosing both prices and price complexity,
an increase in the number of rms leads to an increase in the overall complexity of the
market. Like in the duopoly framework, the frequency with which rms use low complexity
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is independent of consumersdegree of sophistication. As a result, initiatives which improve
consumer awareness do not lead to reductions in the overall market complexity.
For a given market structure, a lower degree of concavity or higher degree of convexity
in confusion technology leads to a decrease in market complexity. When  2 (1; 2), higher
complexity of rivals o¤ers partly o¤sets the increase in confusion resulting from a rms
incremental complexity. However, as  increases, this o¤setting e¤ect gets smaller and, as a
rms incentives to choose high complexity are reduced,  increases. When  > 2, higher rival
complexity magnies the increase in confusion resulting from the incremental complexity of
a rms o¤er. This creates a free-riding e¤ect and an increase in  further weakens a rms
incentives to use high complexity. Figure 3 provides an illustration.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium probability of using k () as a function of n. From bottom to top for
 equal to 1.5, 1.7, 2, 3, and 3.5.
The equilibrium expected share of confused consumers is
E [1  ] 
nX
m=0
Cmn 
m(1  )n m(1  (n m)) :
For a given number of rms, E[1   ] aggregates the shares of confused consumers in the
sequence (1   (n   m))nm=0, weighting each share by the overall probability that m rms
choose low complexity and n m rms choose high complexity. Using (3) for  6= 2 and (4)
for  = 2, equilibrium expected share of confused becomes
E [1  ] =
8><>:
(1  min)
[1 + (1  )(   2)]n   1
(   1)n   1 for  6= 2
(1  min)(1  ) for  = 2
: (19)
This analysis focuses on the impact of convexity or concavity of the confusion technology on
market outcomes. For this reason, the comparative statics and convergence results discussed
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below assume that the lower bound of the share of experts in the market is independent of the
number of rms, i.e. (n) = min is a constant. This is equivalent to assuming that (1 min)
- the maximal share of confused consumers - is xed regardless of the market structure. By
xing the maximal share of confused, when the number of rms is increased, each of them
is made smaller with respect to the market, as each rms maximal base of confused is then
xed at the level (1  min)= n.19
The convergence properties of the expected share of confused consumers in fragmented
markets depend on whether the confusion technology is concave or convex in rmscomplexity
choices.
Corollary 4 In the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, the expected share of confused con-
sumers in (19) decreases in min and
lim
n!1E [1  ] =

(1  min) for  2 (1; 2]
0 for  > 2
:
This corollary formalizes Carlins intuition that the convergence results for the expected
number of confused depend on the properties of the confusion technology. If the confusion
technology is convex in rmscomplexity levels, the expected share of confused consumers
converges to zero. For expositional ease, this analysis assumes that (0) = 1, that is, when
all rms use low complexity, there are no confused consumers. If (0) < 1, so that there is
some confusion even when all rms use low complexity, then in highly fragmented markets
where  > 2, the expected share of confused consumers would converge to the minimal level
(1  (0)) instead; see footnote 2. In contrast, if the confusion technology is concave in rms
complexity levels ( 2 (1; 2)), the expected share of confused is bounded away from zero and
converges to (1  min).
The concavity or convexity of the confusion technology in this model is captured by the
sequence of shares (1  (n m))nm=0. A simple illustration is provided below.
Example 6 Let min = 0 and consider (3). If  = 3, then, 1   (n   m) = (2n m   1)=
(2n   1) and limn!1(1  (n m)) = 2 m. If  = 3=2, then 1  (n m) = (0:5n m   1)=
(0:5n   1) and limn!1(1  (n m)) = 1.
Intuitively, in fragmented markets, convexity requires a relatively ine¤ective confusion
technology and so, although rms use almost surely high complexity (i.e., despite the lack of
market transparency), the expected share of confused converges to zero. In contrast, concavity
requires a relatively e¤ective confusion technology. If the confusion technology is concave, in
highly fragmented markets, lack of transparency is aligned with a high expected share of
19For a discussion of comparative statics in large oligopoly markets, see Chapter 5.2.5. in Vives (2001).
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confused consumers. This is also the case when there are no second order e¤ects in confusion,
so the results for  = 2 are qualitatively similar to those that obtain under concavity.
Beyond the convergence results presented in Corollary 4, numerical simulations indicate
that the expected number of confused consumers increases monotonically in n for  2 (1; 2].
For  = 2, this monotonicity result can be derived analytically using Corollary 3. For all
 > 2, E[1  ] decreases in n at least when n is large enough. For   3; its value at n = 2
is larger than the value at n = 3, and then E[1 ] decreases monotonically in n for n  3.20
However, for  2 (2; 2:8) it peaks at some value n0()  3. Numerical examples also indicate
that the expected share of confused consumers strictly decreases in  for given n and min.
Example 7 Let min = 0. Consider  = 3=2, 2, or 3. The expected share of confused as a
function of the number of rms is illustrated in Figure 4 and presented in the appendix.
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Figure 4: Expected share of confused consumers in equilibrium for (n) = 0. In red for
 = 3; in green for  = 2, and in blue for  = 3=2.
As discussed, the analysis holds the minimal share of experts xed, so market fragmen-
tation does not have a direct impact on consumer sophistication. Suppose instead that
min = (n) is a decreasing function of n. Then, the more fragmented the market, the
lower the minimal share of experts is. This could be the case in a market where there is
choice overload and consumers are more likely to make random choices when they face more
options. Using (19), it is easy to see that the qualitative results in Corollary 4 carry over
unchanged. For  > 2, (1   (n)) is bounded above by 1, so that in the limit, the expected
share of confused still goes to zero. For  2 (1; 2], the expected share of confused converges
to limn!1(1   (n)) > (1   (2)) > 0. Now, suppose that (n) is an increasing function
of n, that is, the more fragmented the market, the higher the minimal share of experts is.
20For  2 [3; 3:15), the expected number of confused is an inverted U function of n, but reaches a maximum
at some n0() 2 (2; 3).
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Arguably, this is a less realistic case as it requires market structure to have a positive impact
on consumer sophistication. For  > 2, (1  (n)) is bounded below by zero, so the expected
share of confused still converges to zero. However, for  2 (1; 2], the expected share of con-
fused may converge to zero as almost all consumers are sophisticated in nearly competitive
markets.21
Corollary 5 In symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, expected industry prot (n = n)
decreases in min, and is strictly larger than expected share of confused. Furthermore,
lim
n!1n =
(
(1  min) for  2 (1; 2]
0 for  > 2
:
An increase in the level of consumer sophistication has a positive e¤ect on consumer
surplus (as total welfare is normalized to one). Combined with the ndings in Corollary 3,
this implies that an improvement in consumer awareness boosts consumer welfare, but does
not reduce overall market complexity. Hence, the insight from the duopoly model that market
transparency is not a good indicator of market performance carries over to more fragmented
environments.
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ß=1.75
ß=1.50
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Figure 5: Equilibrium industry prot (n) as a function of n for min = 0 and various values
of .
In nearly perfectly competitive markets, when the confusion technology is concave, or
when it is linear (i.e., there are no second order e¤ects), expected industry prot is bounded
away from zero. As total prot is larger than the expected share of confused, this result is
21See also the examples in Carlin, 2009 (section 4, p. 284). In the rst one, like in this analysis, (n) is
independent of n, while in the second, (n) increases with n.
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closely related to Corollary 4. On the other hand, when the confusion technology is convex
in complexity levels, expected prot converges to zero as the number of rms goes to innity.
In this case, although rms choose high complexity almost surely, confusion technology is
relatively ine¢ cient and fragmented markets may be highly competitive.
In general, industry prot and implicitly consumer surplus are not monotonic in the num-
ber of rms. An increase in competitive pressure gives rms stronger incentives to undercut
and attract the experts, but also to use more frequently high complexity (k), which is asso-
ciated with relatively higher prices. Numerical simulations also suggest that industry prot
decreases in  for given min and n. Figure 4 provides an illustration for min = 0. Numerical
simulations provide further insights. Table 1 presents equilibrium outcomes for various values
of n and , letting min = 0:6.
Table 1 (min = 0:6)
 n   n p0 p^ E[1  ]
3=2 3 0:268 0:122 0:365 0:149 0:275 0:852
3=2 4 0:227 0:094 0:377 0:125 0:254 0:916
3=2 10 0:127 0:04 0:4 0:062 0:185 0:998
2 3 0:423 0:096 0:287 0:107 0:324 0:578
2 4 0:370 0:072 0:289 0:084 0:325 0:63
2 10 0:226 0:032 0:320 0:043 0:347 0:774
3 3 0:594 0:056 0:169 0:058 0:363 0:254
3 4 0:540 0:034 0:14 0:036 0:374 0:236
3 10 0:368 0:006 0:064 0:007 0:399 0:13
In these examples, p0 decreases in n for given  and in  for given n. p^ decreases in n for
 = 3=2, it increases in n for  = 2 and  = 3, and it increases in  for given n. Expected
industry prot and expected share of confused increase in n for  = 3=2 and  = 2, decrease
in n for  = 3, and decreases in  for given n.
7 Conclusions
This paper develops a richer framework for the analysis of competition in homogeneous prod-
uct markets where sellers compete by choosing both prices and the complexity of their price
structures. Price complexity increases the cost of gathering information about prices and
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identifying the best deal, and is a source of consumer confusion. A distinctive feature of the
proposed model is that it accommodates more general confusion technologies, which may be
either concave or convex in rmscomplexity levels. Our results suggest that the characteris-
tics of the confusion technology have an impact on market outcomes and implications for the
design and assessment of competition and consumer protection policy. Furthermore, the char-
acteristics of confusion technology can be related to consumerscost of gathering market-wide
information and to a wider range of underlying consumer behavior.
Despite product homogeneity, in markets with strategic price complexity, there is equi-
librium dispersion in both prices and price complexity levels, there is a positive relationship
between prices and complexity, and rms make strictly positive prots. In relatively con-
centrated markets, an increase in the number of competitors triggers an increase in market
complexity but has ambiguous e¤ects on consumer surplus. In nearly perfectly competitive
markets, although rms use almost surely high price complexity, if the confusion technology
is convex, expected industry prots converge to zero, whereas, if the technology is concave,
expected industry prots converge to the highest level. An improvement in consumer sophis-
tication boosts consumer welfare but does not reduce the overall complexity of the market.
Therefore, interventions which increase consumer awareness are benecial, but their e¤ective-
ness cannot be measured by the degree of market transparency they achieve.
8 Appendix
8.1 Preliminary Results
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) Let eS be the convex hull of S. Suppose there is a gap G  eS. Let
A = fp 2 S j p  inf Gg, pa = maxA and p0 = supG. Clearly, pa 2 S and F (pa) = F (p0).
But then i(p0; k; j) > i(pa; k; j). A contradiction.
(ii) (a) Suppose there is a mass point at some p0 2 S with 0 < p0 < maxS. Then, there is a
positive probability of a tie at this price. (a1) If (p0) > 0, the expected share of experts at
this price is strictly positive when all rms tie. Then, rm i is better o¤ deviating to p0   
as there is a discrete increase in market share and only a marginal decrease in price. This
deviation applies also at p0 = maxS, so that rms cannot have a mass point at the upper
bound of S. (a2) If (p0) = 0, the share of experts at this price is min. If min > 0, the
argument in (a1) applies unchanged. If min = 0, in the event of a tie at p
0, all consumers
are confused and rm i is better o¤ moving mass from price p0 to price p = maxS. Note that
this argument does not rule out a mass point at the upper bound of S when min = 0. (c)
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Suppose there is a mass point at p0 = 0. In this case, all rms make zero prots. If (p0) < 1,
then there are some confused consumers when rms tie at this price and rm i is better o¤
deviating to p = 1 and making positive prots on its share of confused. If (p0) = 0, all
consumers are experts when rms tie, but then rm i is better o¤ deviating to p = 1 and
ki = k, where it makes positive prot.
(iii) It follows from (i) that in symmetric equilibrium S is a bounded interval. Suppose
ph = supS < 1. If min > 0, by (ii) rms pricing c.d.f.s are continuous everywhere, so a
rm charging p! ph sells only to its share of confused consumers and it is clearly better o¤
deviating to a higher price p = 1. If min = 0, there may be a positive probability of a tie
at ph but, as all consumers are confused when all rms tie, deviating to p = 1 is protable.
A contradiction. As ph = 1, rmsexpected prot in the mixed strategy equilibrium will be
strictly positive, so it must be that p0 = minS > 0.
8.2 Duopoly Analysis
Expected Prots
Using (10), we re-write a rms expected prots. If rm i chooses complexity k and charges
a price p 2 [p0; p^), as (0) = 1, (7) becomes
i (p; k) = p

(  F (p)) + (1  )(1) + (1  )(1  (1))
2

:
If instead rm i chooses k and charges p 2 [p^; 1], expression (8) becomes
i
 
p; k

= p

(1  F (p))(2) + (1  (1))
2
+
(1  )(1  (2))
2

:
Cumulative Price Distributions
The cumulative price distribution is presented below.
1  F (p) =
8>>><>>>:
(1  min)
22

2   1
p
+ 1

for p 2 [p0; p^) ;
(1  min) (2   1)
22min

1
p
  1

for p 2 [p^; 1], if min > 0 :
(A1)
Proof of Proposition 1. It is easy to see that ; p0, p^, and F (p) as presented in (11),
(12), and (A1) are all well dened.
Consider a unilateral deviation to (p < p0; k): The deviators market share is equal to that
corresponding to p = p0 but, as the price is lower, this deviation is not protable.
Consider a unilateral deviation to (p > p^; k). This results in deviation prot
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d (p; k) = p

(1  F (p))(1) + (1  (0))
2
+
(1  )(1  (1))
2

<

 
p; k

= p

(1  F (p))(2) + (1  (1))
2
+
(1  )(1  (2))
2

.
The inequality follows as, for p > p^,
 
d (p; k)    p; k
p
=
(1  F (p))((1)  (2))  ((0)  (1))
2
  (1  )((1)  (2))
2

=
((1)  (2))

(1  F (p))  
2(   1)  
(1  )
2

<
((1)  (2))

(1  F (p^))  
2(   1)  
(1  )
2

= 0:
Consider a unilateral deviation to
 
p < p^; k

. This results in deviation prot
d
 
p; k

= p

(1  )(2) + (  F (p))(1) + (1  )(1  (2))
2
+
(1  (1))
2

<
 (p; k) = p

(1  )(1) + (  F (p)) + (1  )(1  (1))
2

:
The inequality follows as, for p < p^,
 
d
 
p; k
   (p; k)
p
=
  (1  )((1)  (2))  (  F (p)) (1  (1)) + (1  )((1)  (2))
2
+
(1  (1))
2
=
((1)  (2)) 2(  F (p))  (   1)(1  ) + 
2(   1) <
((1)  (2)) (   1)(1  ) + 
2(   1) = 0:
Equilibrium Expected Share of Confused Consumers.
2X
m=0
Cm2 
m(1  )2 m(1  (2 m)) = (1  min)(3   2)
3
: (A2)
For min < 1 is strictly lower than expected industry prots.
Proof of Corollary 1. Using (11), d=d = 1=2 > 0.
Di¤erentiating (A2) w.r.t.  gives  2(1  min)(   1)=4 < 0.
Using (12), dp0=d =  2(1  min)[1  min+ 2(   1)]= [22   (1  min)]2 < 0.
Using (12), dp^=d = 2(1   min)min= [2   (1   min)]2. So, for min > 0, dp^=d > 0 and
min = 0, dp^=d = 0.
Using (11), d=d = (1=2)(d2=d) =  (1  min)(   1)= 3 < 0.
Using (A1), E(p) =
R p^
p0
(1  F (p)) dp+ R 1p^ (1  F (p)) dp+ p0. By Leibnizs rule,
dE(p)=d = (1  F (p^)) (dp^=d)  (1  F (p0)) dp0=d +R p^
p0
( dF (p)=d) dp  (1  F (p^)) (dp^=d)+ R 1p^ ( dF (p)=d) dp+ dp0=d =
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R p^
p0
( dF (p)=d) dp+ R 1p^ ( dF (p)=d) dp.
But, for p 2 [p0; p^), using (A1), dF (p)=d = (1   min)(   1 + p)= 3p > 0. For p 2 [p^; 1]
and min > 0, dF (p)=d = (1   min)(   1)(1   p)= 3minp > 0. Then it follows that
dE(p)=d < 0. For min = 0, p^ = 1 and the second integral in E(p) is a constant, so
dE(p)=d =
R p^
p0
( dF (p)=d) dp < 0.
Conditional Price Distribution. The price distribution conditional on the price being
below the cut-o¤ value p^ and the corresponding conditional expected price are given by
F (p j p < p^) = F (p)=F (p^) = 2
2   (1  min)
2(   1)  
(1  min) (2   1)
2(   1)p ;
E(p j p < p^) = (1  min) (2   1)
2(   1) ln
22   (1  min)
2   (1  min)
: (A3)
Proof of Corollary 2. Using (11), d=dmin = 0.
Using (12), dp0=dmin =  2(2   1)2= [22   (1  min)]2 < 0.
Using (12), dp^=dmin =  2(2   1)= [2   (1  min)]2 < 0.
Using (11), d=dmin =  (2   1)= 22 < 0.
Di¤erentiating (A2) w.r.t. min gives  (3   2)=3 < 0.
Using (A1), E(p) =
R p^
p0
(1  F (p)) dp+ R 1p^ (1  F (p)) dp+ p0. Then, by Leibnizs rule,R p^
p0
( dF (p)=dmin) dp+
R 1
p^ ( dF (p)=dmin) dp.
But, for p 2 [p0; p^), using (A1), dF (p)=dmin = [(2   1)=p+ 1]= 22 > 0. For p 2 [p^; 1] and
min > 0, dF (p)=dmin = (2   1)(1   p)= 22minp > 0. It follows that dE(p)=dmin < 0.
For min = 0, p^ = 1 and the second integral in E(p) is a constant, so dE(p)=dmin =R p^
p0
( dF (p)=dmin) dp < 0.
Using (A3), it follows that
dE(p j p < p^)= dmin =
 
(
(1  min) (2   1)
[2   (1  min)]

22   (1  min)
 + 2   1
2(   1) ln
22   (1  min)
2   (1  min)
)
< 0.
8.3 Oligopoly Analysis
Proof of Lemma 4. By (3) and (13),
 =
Pn 1
m=0 P
m
n 1((n m  1)  (n m)) = (1  (1))
Pn 1
m=0 P
m
n 1(   1)n m 1 =
(1  (1))Pn 1m=0
(P
MMm
" Q
j2M
(pj)
Q
k2N iM
(1  (pk))
#
(   1)n m 1
)
:
For a given m, jN iM j = n m  1, so we can re-write  as
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(1  (1))Pn 1m=0
(P
MMm
Q
j2M
(pj)
Q
k2N iM
[(1  (pk))(   1)]
)
:
As we rst sum over all values of m (for 0  m  n   1), and then over all subsets of
cardinality m in }(N i), we are e¤ectively summing up over all the subsets M in }(N i).
Then,  becomes
(1  (1))PM}(N i) Q
j2M
(pj)
Q
k2N iM
[(1  (pk))(   1)] :
Consider rival ls price pl. Each term in the sum above contains either (pl) or (1  (pl)).
In fact, for each term in the summation which includes (pl), there is a pairwhich includes
(1  (pl)) and all other multipliers are the same. Formally, take some set M l  }(N i) such
that l 2M l: Then, 9M l such thatM l = M l[flg. Pairing all such subsets, we can re-write
the sum above by factoring out the term [(pl) + (1  (pl))(   1)]. So,
 = (1 (1)) [(pl) + (1  (pl))(   1)]
X
M}(N i; l)
Q
j2M
(pj)
Q
k2N iM
[(1  (pk))(   1)] ;
where }(N i; l) is the power set of N n fi; lg  N i; l.
By iteration,
 = (1  (1)) Q
j 6=i
[(pj) + (1  (pj))(   1)] = (1  (1))
Q
j 6=i
[1 + (1  (pj))(   2)] :
Proof of Proposition 2. Using (14), let
(p)   n  1
n
Q
j 6=i
Z 1
p
(pj)dF (pj) +
1
n
Q
j 6=i
Z p
p0
(pj)dF (pj) =
i(p; k)  i(p; k)
p(1  (1)) :
As (pj) > 0 (see Lemma 4), it is easy to check that (p0) < 0 and (1) > 0. Furthermore,
(p) is strictly increasing in p. As changes in p only a¤ect the integration ranges in (p),
d(p)
dp
= [1 + (1  (p))(   2))]

n  1
n

1 +
1
n

2

where

1 =
P
j 6=i
( Q
k 6=i;k 6=j
R 1
p [1 + (1  (pjk))(   2))]dF (pjk)
)
> 0 and

2 =
P
j 6=i
( Q
k 6=i;k 6=j
R p
p0
[1 + (1  (pjk))(   2))]dF (pjk)
)
> 0:
So, to maximize its expected prot a rm i chooses according to (10), where the threshold
price p^ 2 (p0; 1] satises (p^) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Step 1: Expected Prots. At price p 2 [p0; p^), which is associated with k, rm is expected
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prot is
 (p; k) =
p
(
n 1X
m=0
Cmn 1(1  )n 1 m

(  F (p))m(n m  1) + 1
n
m(1  (n m  1))
)
:
When n 1 m competitors choose k (and so price above p^  p) and m competitors choose k
(which happens with probability m(1 )n 1 m) rm i serves 1=n of the (1 (n m  1))
confused. It also serves (n   m   1) experts whenever all m rms choosing k o¤er prices
higher than p (which happens with probability (   F (p))m(1   )n 1 m). This gives the
term in square brackets. The term in curly brackets considers all possible combinations of
n  1 taken m and gives rm is market share at price p.
Then, rm is expected prots at p = p0 and when p! p^ are,
 (p0; k) = p0
(
n 1X
m=0
Cmn 1
m(1  )n 1 m[(n m  1) + 1
n
(1  (n m  1))]
)
; (A4)
lim
p!p^
 (p^; k) = p^
"
(1  )n 1'(1) + 1
n
n 1X
m=0
Cmn 1
m(1  )n 1 m(1  (n m  1))
#
: (A5)
At price p 2 [p^; 1], which is associated with k, rm is expected prot is

 
p; k

= p
"
(1  F (p))n 1(n) +
n 1X
m=0
Cmn 1
m(1  )n 1 m (1  (n m))
n
#
:
When m competitors choose k (and so o¤er prices below p^ < p) and n   1  m competitors
choose k, rm i serves a share 1=n of the (1   (n  m)) confused consumers. The second
term in square brackets considers all possible combinations of n   1 taken m. Firm i serves
expert consumers only if all rivals choose high complexity (that is, if n   m = n) and if it
o¤ers the lowest price, as reected by the rst term in square brackets.
Then, rm is expected prot at p = p^ is

 
p^; k

= p^
"
(1  )n 1(n) +
n 1X
m=0
Cmn 1
m(1  )n 1 m (1  (n m))
n
#
:
Step 2: Lambda. The equilibrium probability of choosing k presented in (15) follows from,
limp!p^  (p^; k) = 
 
p^; k
,
(1  )n 1((n  1)  (n)) = 1
n
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m(1  )n 1 m((n m  1)  (n m)),
((n  1)  (n))(1  )n 1 = 1  (1)
n
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m [(1  )(   1)]n 1 m

,
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(1  (1)) [(1  )(   1)]n 1 = 1  (1)
n
[1 + (1  )(   2)]n 1:
Step 3: Equilibrium Prot. (16) obtains by evaluating the expected prot at p = 1 and
using (3).

 
1; k

=
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m(1  )n 1 m (1  (n m))
n
=
(1  (n))
n[(   1)n   1]
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m(1  )n 1 m[(   1)n m   1] =
(1  (n))
n[(   1)n   1]
h
(   1)Pn 1m=0Cmn 1m(1  )n 1 m (   1)n 1 m   1i =
(1  (n))
n[(   1)n   1]
n
(   1)Pn 1m=0Cmn 1m [(1  ) (   1)]n 1 m   1o =
(1  (n))
n[(   1)n   1]

(   1)[1 + (1  )(   2)]n 1   1	.
Then Step 2 implies that [1 + (1  )(   2)]n 1 = n [(1  )(   1)]n 1 and (16) follows.
Step 4: Equilibrium Boundary Prices and Pricing Distribution Functions.
I p0 and p^ are dened by (p0; k) =  and limp!p^  (p^; k) =  , where the LHS terms are
presented in (A4) and (A5), respectively, the RHS term is given by (16), and  follows from
(15).
Firm is market share at p0 - the term in curly brackets in (A4) - is larger than its market
share when p ! p^ - the term in square brackets in (A5) because (1   )n 1(n   1) <Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m(1 )n 1 m(n m 1). This implies that p0 < p^ as the equilibrium constant
prot condition requires  (p0; k) = limp!p^  (p^; k).
Moreover, p^  1; with equality i¤ (n) = 0. Using (A5) and (16), p^  1 requires that
1
n
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m(1  )n 1 m(1  (n m)) 
(1  )n 1(n  1) + 1n
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m(1  )n 1 m(1  (n m  1)),
1
n
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m(1  )n 1 m((n m  1)  (n m))  (1  )n 1(n  1),
1
n
[+ (1  )(   1)]n 1   [(1  )(   1)]n 1  (1  )n 1 (n)
1  (1) :
(15) implies that the LHS is equal to zero. The RHS is nonnegative and may be equal to zero
only if (n) = 0. So p^ < 1 if (n) > 0 and p^ = 1 if (n) = 0.
Below, we focus on the pricing c.d.f.s. Note that  is dened in (16) and independent of p.
I For p 2 [p0; p^), F (p) is implicitly determined by (k; p) = :
Di¤erentiating w.r.t. p both sides gives
  F 0 (p)Pn 1m=1Cmn 1 m(  F (p))m 1(1  )n 1 m(n m  1) =   p2 :
In this interval, F (p) < F (p^) =  and the summation is strictly positive. Then, F (p) is
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strictly increasing in p.
For p 2 [p^; 1], F (p) is implicitly determined by (k; p) =  ,
(1  F (p))n 1(n) +Pn 1m=0Cmn 1m(1  )n 1 m (1  (n m))n = p :
It is easy to see that F (p) is strictly increasing on this interval.
Furthermore, F (p) is continuous at p^, and satises F (p0) = 0 and F (1) = 1.
Step 5: No Protable Unilateral Deviations.
Consider a unilateral deviation to (p < p0; k): The deviators market share is equal to that
corresponding to p = p0 but, as the price is lower, this deviation is not protable.
Consider a unilateral deviation to (p > p^; k). This results in deviation prot
d (p; k) = p

(1  F (p))n 1(n  1) + 1
n
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1(1  )n 1 mm(1  (n m  1))

:
But d (p; k) < 
 
p; k
,
(1  F (p))n 1(n  1) + 1
n
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1(1  )n 1 mm(1  (n m  1)) <
(1  F (p))n 1(n)) + 1
n
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m(1  )n 1 m(1  (n m)),
(1 F (p))n 1((n  1) (n)) < 1
n
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m(1 )n 1 m((n m  1) (n m)),
(1  F (p))n 1(   1)n 1 < 1
n
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m [(1  )(   1)]n 1 m ,
(1  F (p))n 1(   1)n 1 < 1
n
[+ (1  )(   1)]n 1:
The last inequality follows from the fact that, as p > p^,
(1  F (p))n 1(   1)n 1 < (1  F (p^))n 1(   1)n 1 = (1  )n 1(   1)n 1.
It is then easy to check using (15) that (1  )n 1(   1)n 1 = [+ (1  )(   1)]
n 1
n
.
Consider a unilateral deviation to
 
p < p^; k

. This results in deviation prot.
d
 
p; k

= p
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1(1  )n 1 m[(  F (p))m(n m) + m
(1  (n m))
n
]

.
But, d
 
p; k

<  (p; k) asPn 1
m=0C
m
n 1(1  )n 1 m[(  F (p))m(n m) + m
(1  (n m))
n
] <
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1(1  )n 1 m

(  F (p))m(n m  1) + m (1  (n m  1))
n

,
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1(1  )n 1 m((n m  1)  (n m))[ (  F (p))m +
m
n
] < 0,
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1 [(1  )(   1)]n 1 m [ (  F (p))m +
m
n
] < 0,
 Pn 1m=0Cmn 1 [(1  )(   1)]n 1 m (  F (p))m +
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1n
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1 [(1  )(   1)]n 1 m m < 0,
  [(1  )(   1) +   F (p)]n 1 + 1
n
[(1  )(   1) + ]n 1 < 0.
The last inequality follows as for p < p^,
  [(1  )(   1) +   F (p)]n 1 <   [(1  )(   1)]n 1.
But, using (15),   [(1  )(   1)]n 1 + 1
n
[(1  )(   1) + ]n 1 = 0.
8.4 Discussion and Policy Implications
Proof of Corollary 3.
For  6= 2,  is dened in (15) and for  = 2 it is dened in (17). It is easy to see that when
evaluated at  = 2, expression (15) reduces to (17). Therefore, this proof uses (15) to cover
both cases.
Re-write (15) as (~n) = 1  ~n
   1  (   2)~n where ~n = n
 1=(n 1) 2 (0; 1),
with
d~n
dn
=
n n=(n 1)(1  n+ n log n)
(n  1)2 > 0.
Using the chain rule,
d
dn
=
d
d~n
d~n
dn
< 0 as
d
d~n
=      1
[   1  (   2)~n]2 < 0.
limn!1 ~n = exp

limn!1 ln
 
n 1=(n 1)

=
exp

limn!1

  lnn
n  1

=
exp

  limn!1

lnn
n  1

. By LHôpitals rule, limn!1

lnn
n  1

= limn!1
1
n
= 0. So,
limn!1 ~n = 1 and limn!1  = 0 .
Moreover,
d
d(n)
= 0 and
d
d
=
~n(1  ~n)
[   1  (   2)~n]2 > 0:
Proof of Corollary 4.
I Suppose  2 (1; 2). limn!1E[1  ] = limn!1 (1  min) f1  [1 + (1  )(   2)]
ng
1  (   1)n .
In this case, (   1) < 1 and 1 + (1  )(   2) < 1.
As limn!1[1  (   1)n] = 0 and limn!1 f1  [1 + (1  )(   2)]ng = 1, it follows that
limn!1E[1  ] = (1  min).
I Suppose  > 2. It is convenient to write
limn!1E[1  ] = limn!1 (1  min) f[(   1)  (   2)]
n   1g
(   1)n   1 =
(1  min)
limn!1 f[(   1)  (   2)]n   1g
limn!1 [(   1)n   1] .
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limn!1 f[(   1)  (   2)]n   1g = limn!1 [(   1)n   1] =1,
as (   1) > (   1)  (   2) = 1 + (1  )(   2) > 1.
However, the rst inequality implies that the denominator converges faster. It follows that
limn!1E[1  ] = 0.
I Suppose  = 2. By Corollary 3, limn!1(1  ) = 1.
Then, limn!1(1  (n))(1  ) = (1  min):
In all cases, the impact of min is straightforward.
Example 7: Expected share of confused as a function of n.
E [1  ] =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:

1  n 1=(n 1)=(1 + n 1=(n 1))n   1
(1=2)n   1 for  = 3=2
n 1=(n 1) for  = 2
2=(2  n 1=(n 1))n   1
2n   1 for  = 3
:
Proof of Corollary 5.
Expected industry prot in equilibrium is
n =
8>><>>:
(1  min)
n(1  )n 1(   1)n   1
(   1)n   1 for  6= 2
(1  min)
+ n(1  )
n
for  = 2
:
I Consider  6= 2. Using (16), industry prot can be written as
n =
(1  min)
(
(   1)n
1 + (   2)(1  n 1=(n 1))n 1   1
)
(   1)n   1 =
(1  min)

   1  (   2)n 1=(n 1)     1
   1  (   2)n 1=(n 1)
n
  1
(   1)n   1 =
(1  min)

   1  (   2)n 1=(n 1) [+ (1  )(   1)]n   1
(   1)n   1 :
As limn!1

   1  (   2)n 1=(n 1) = 1, it follows that
limn!1 n = limn!1
(1  min) [+ (1  )(   1)]n   1
(   1)n   1 .
But, the RHS is limn!1E[1  ]. Using Corollary 4, the results follow.
I Consider  = 2, using (17), limn!1 n = limn!1(1  min)[

n
+ (1  )]. Using Corollary
3, the result follows.
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Proof of Corollary 5.
I Consider  6= 2.
Using the expressions in Corollaries 4 and 5,
n   E[1  ] = (1  min)

n(1  )n 1(   1)n   1
(   1)n   1  
[1 + (1  )(   2)]n   1
(   1)n   1

=
(1  min)
n(1  )n 1(   1)n   [1 + (1  )(   2)]n
(   1)n   1 =
(1  min)
(   1)[1 + (1  )(   2)]n 1   [1 + (1  )(   2)]n
(   1)n   1 ;
where the last equality uses step 3 in the proof of Proposition 3.
Then, n   E[1  ] = (1  min)
[1 + (1  )(   2)]n 1(   2)(2  )
(   1)n   1 > 0:
I Consider  = 2.
n   E[1  ] = (1  min)

+ n(1  )
n
  (1  )

=
(1  min)
n
> 0:
Online Appendix
Substitutability vs. Complementarity in Confusion
Recall that the prole of rmsprice complexity choices is k, an n vector whose i-th component
is ki. The vector k i is obtained from k by omitting the i-th component, so (ki;k i) = k.
Denote by km an n   1 vector with m components equal to k and the remaining n   1  m
components equal to k, for 0  m  n  1.
The rmsprice complexity levels determine the fraction of experts in the market, which
is given by the following function
' : fk; kgn ! [0; 1] :
An increase in one rms price complexity level lowers the comparability of competing o¤ers
and therefore the fraction of experts in the market, so '(k;k i) > '(k;k i) for all i 2 N .
For expositional simplicity and without loss of generality, let '(k;kn 1) = 1. To capture the
impact of a rivals price complexity on the di¢ culty of evaluating a rms o¤er let
'(k;km)  '(k;km) = ('(k;km 1)  '(
k;km 1))
   1 ;
for  > 1. Using '(k;kn 1) = 1, (2) implies that
1  '(k;kn 1) = ('(k;km)  '(
k;km))
(   1)n 1 m =
('(k;k0)  '(k;k0))
(   1)n 1 :
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As '(k;km) = '(k;km 1), using (3),
'(k;km) =
'(k;k0)
Pn 1 m
k=0 (   1)k +
Pn 1
k=n m(   1)kPn 1
k=0(   1)k
= 1  (1  '(
k;k0))[(   1)n m   1]
(   1)n   1 :
Case 1. Substitutability in Confusion. When 1 <  < 2, the confusion technology,
(1  '), satises strictly decreasing di¤erences.
Formally, for  2 (1; 2),
 
1  '(k; km)
  (1  '(k;km)) >  1  '(k; km 1)  (1  '(k;km 1)) :
so that a rms incremental increase in price complexity is more e¤ective in creating confusion
when rivalsprice complexity is lower (in the sense that fewer competitors employ k).
Case 2. Complementarity in Confusion. When  > 2, the confusion technology,
(1  '), satises strictly increasing di¤erences.
For  > 2,
 
1  '(k; km)
  (1  '(k;km)) <  1  '(k; km 1)  (1  '(k;km 1)) :
so that a rms incremental increase in price complexity is more e¤ective when rivalsprice
complexity is higher.
Case 3. No Second Order E¤ects in Confusion. When  = 2, the price complexity
of one rm does not a¤ect the e¤ectiveness of an increase in a rivals complexity.
 
1  '(k; km)
  (1  '(k;km)) =  1  '(k; km 1)  (1  '(k;km 1)) :
so that a rms incremental increase in price complexity is independent of rivalsprice com-
plexity levels.
Proof of Proposition 4. First note that the incremental protability of an increase in
complexity in this case is given by i
 
p; k
  i (p; k) =
p
R 1
p :::
R 1
p
hPn 1
m=0 P
m
n 1 ((n m)  (n m  1))
i
dF (pj):::dF (pk) +
p
n
R 1
p0
:::
R 1
p0
hPn 1
m=0 P
m
n 1((n m  1)  (n m))
i
dF (pj):::dF (pk) =
p (1  (1))

 (1  F (p))n 1 + 1
n

:
But, at p = p0, the term above is negative, while at p = 1, it is positive. As F (p) is strictly
increasing in p, 
 
p; k
 i (p; k) < 0 for p < p^ and rms choose k, while   p; k i (p; k) > 0
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for p > p^ and rms choose k. The cut-o¤ price p^ solves (1  F (p^))n 1 = 1=n.
Step 1 in the proof of Proposition 3 carries over unchanged. Then, the constant prot condi-
tion requires that
 (p^; k) = limp!p^ 
 
p^; k
,
(1  )n 1((n  1)  (n)) = 1
n
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m(1  )n 1 m((n m  1)  (n m)),
(1  )n 1 = 1
n
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m(1  )n 1 m ,
(1  )n 1 = 1
n
and (17) follows.
Equilibrium prot (as a function of ) obtains by evaluating the expected prot at p = 1 and
using (4).

 
1; k

=
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m(1  )n 1 m (1  (n m))
n
=
(1  (n))Pn 1m=0Cmn 1m(1  )n 1 m (n m)n2 =
(1  (n))+ n(1  )
n2
and (18) follows.
Below, we identify the equilibrium boundary prices and pricing c.d.f.s.
 (p0; k) = p0
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m(1  )n 1 m

(n m  1) + 1
n
(1  (n m  1))

=
p0
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m(1  )n 1 m

1  n  1
n
(1  (n m  1))

=
p0

1  (1  (n))(n  1)
2(1  )
n2

.
Then, using  (p0; k) = , where the RHS is dened in (18), it follows that
p0 =
(1  (n))[+ n(1  )]
n2   (1  (n))(n  1)2(1  ) .

 
p^; k

= p^

(1  )n 1(n) +Pn 1m=0Cmn 1m(1  )n 1 m (1  (n m))n

=
p^

(1  )n 1(n) + (1  (n))+ n(1  )
n2

.
Then, using 
 
p^; k

= , where the RHS is dened in (18), it follows that
p^ =
(1  (n))[+ n(1  )]
n  (1  (n))(n  1) .
It is easy to check that p^  1; with equality if and only if (n) = 0, and that p0 < p^.
F (p) is implicitly determined by (k; p) =  and (k; p) = .
For p 2 [p0; p^), F (p) solvesPn 1
m=0C
m
n 1

(  F (p))m(1  )n 1 m(n m  1) + m(1  )n 1 m (1  (n m  1))
n

=

p
,
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Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1(  F (p))m(1  )n 1 m(n m  1) +Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m(1  )n 1 m (1  (n m  1))
n
=

p
,
1
n
(1  F (p))n 2 f(1  )[1 + (n)(n  1)] + (  F (p))ng+Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m(1  )n 1 m (1  (n m  1))
n
=

p
:
It is straightforward to see that both the LHS and the RHS above are decreasing in F (p). So
F (p) is strictly increasing in p in this interval.
For p 2 [p^; 1]; if (n) > 0, F (p) solves
(1  F (p))n 1(n) +Pn 1m=0Cmn 1m(1  )n 1 m (1  (n m))n = p ,
(1  F (p))n 1(n) + (1  (n))
n2
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m(1  )n 1 m(n m) = 
p
(1  F (p))n 1(n) + (1  (n))+ n(1  )
n2
=

p
(1  F (p))n 1(n) = 

1
p
  1

.
It is easy to see that F (p) is strictly increasing in this interval.
No Protable Unilateral Deviations.
Consider a unilateral deviation to (p < p0; k): The deviators market share is equal to that
corresponding to p = p0 but, as the price is lower, this deviation is not protable.
Consider a unilateral deviation to (p > p^; k). This results in deviation prot
d (p; k) = p

(1  F (p))n 1(n  1) + 1
n
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1(1  )n 1 mm(1  (n m  1))

.
But d (p; k) < 
 
p; k
,
(1 F (p))n 1((n  1) (n)) < 1
n
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m(1 )n 1 m((n m  1) (n m)),
(1   F (p))n 1 < 1
n
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1
m(1   )n 1 m , (1   F (p))n 1 < 1
n
as (1   F (p))n 1 <
(1  )n 1.
Consider a unilateral deviation to
 
p < p^; k

. This results in deviation prot.
d
 
p; k

= p
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1(1  )n 1 m[(  F (p))m(n m) +
m(1  (n m))
n
]

.
But, d
 
p; k

<  (p; k) asPn 1
m=0C
m
n 1(1  )n 1 m((n m  1)  (n m))[ (  F (p))m +
m
n
] < 0,
Pn 1
m=0C
m
n 1(1 )n 1 m[ ( F (p))m+
m
n
] < 0,  (1 F (p)n 1+ 1
n
< 0 as (1 F (p)n 1 >
(1  )n 1.
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